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Personhood, Violence, and the Moral Work of Memory in 
Contemporary Rwanda
Laura Eramian, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada
Why do Rwandan genocide survivors informally remember not only the kin they lost in the 1994 genocide, but also losses suffered by friends and acquaint-
ances? Drawing on one year of ethnographic fieldwork in the Rwandan university town of Butare, I argue that survivors are at pains to reconstitute their per-
sonhood in the absence of relations, and informal memory practices are a form of moral work by which they struggle to do so. I show that survivors maintain 
limited exchange relations with the dead by thinking of them regularly in return for protection and guidance, and that they use their knowledge of others’ 
losses to stake moral claims to still being “of” Butare. I theorise these narratives using anthropological perspectives on the constitution of personhood through 
memory and social relationships. The moral demands of remembering the dead give rise to complex predicaments with which survivors of violence must con-
tend as they navigate what it means to dwell in a present that is marred by the absence of significant others.
It was tax season in Rwanda, and Pauline,1 a widowed 
genocide survivor, and small business owner in her fifties, 
was worried about not being able to make her payments 
before the 31 March deadline. We had been discussing 
these and other challenges she faces in running her busi-
ness when her thoughts took a seemingly unexpected 
turn:
You know, a survivor I know came to see me the other day. She 
lost all of her family in 1994 except for an uncle and a sister-
in-law. I have the impression that she isn’t well. It seems that 
some of her family’s remains were recently found not far from 
here. What’s a person to do when they hear that kind of news?2
(March 2009, Butare)
During my fieldwork in the Rwandan university town of 
Butare in 2008–2009, narratives like Pauline’s that attest 
to losses in the 1994 genocide arose in the course of 
everyday conversation with Tutsi survivors. These infor-
mal practices of remembering, which I witnessed several 
times a week and sometimes several times in a day, were 
typically directed at establishing how many and what 
kinds of relations people had lost or the circumstances of 
their deaths. Accounts were more like short interludes in 
conversations than formal memorial practices sym-
bolically demarcated from the everyday as in official 
commemorations. Sometimes seeing a person or place or 
object seemed to precipitate these testimonials; at other 
times, I had no idea what brought them on. Even though 
these interjections went by quickly, I contend that their 
duration is not indicative of their significance. Strikingly, 
survivors spoke less often about their own losses than of 
the numbers and categories of kin lost by other town 
residents, many of whom were no more than acquaint-
ances.
I would like to thank Klaus Neumann, Dan Ander-
son, Simon Robins, Lindsay DuBois, Peter Mallory, 
Borislava Manojlovic, and three anonymous 
reviewers for their comments on this article. I also 
thank Malcolm Blincow, Carlota McAllister, Paul 
Antze, Dan Yon, and Christina Clark-Kazak for their 
comments on earlier drafts. This research was 
funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada.
1 All names used here are pseudonyms, and some 
details of people’s lives have been changed to further 
protect their identities.
2 All interviews and conversations cited in this 
article took place in French. All translations are mine.
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In this article, I use anthropological perspectives on 
remembering as a moral practice tied to personhood to 
understand what survivors are doing when they recount 
who lost whom in 1994. I argue that genocide survivors in 
Butare undertake a crucial form of moral work when they 
informally – yet habitually – attest to their own and others’ 
losses in the genocide. I call this “work” because of the 
effort undertaken to reckon with the violent past – work 
that is moral because it constitutes a “continuous practical 
judgment in the living of a moral life,” a life composed of 
both “speaking the future and speaking the past” (Lambek 
2006, 213). Indeed, remembering is a moral practice 
because memory is itself a function of social relationships 
(Lambek 1996), which encompasses an understanding of 
obligations concerning what is owed to others, including 
the dead. Through informal remembering, survivors lay 
bare concerns about personhood and their place in the 
world that remain peripheral in prominent frameworks on 
memory and violence. The argument is predicated, first, on 
the anthropological view that one’s social relationships, 
especially kinship and exchange of shared substances like 
food or drink, are constitutive of one’s personhood (Geertz 
1973; Mauss 1967 [1925] and 1985 [1938]; Strathern 
1988), and second, on the challenges that genocide surviv-
ors – especially educated ones – face in claiming to be fully 
“of” Butare. It is in the context of a devastating history of 
violence in which persons have lost so many relations that 
these dimensions of remembering come into particularly 
sharp relief. The dead are by no means absent from the 
world of the living, but their presence is a terribly partial 
one that survivors struggle to maintain.
During my fieldwork, I investigated not only memory prac-
tices around the genocide, but also their intersection with 
socially charged relationships of work, friendship, neigh-
bourliness, and clientship. It was in conversations on these 
and other topics that informal remembering of genocide 
victims arose. Interviews and conversations took place in 
private homes, at the National University, at people’s work-
places, at local cabarets [bars], and on walks around the 
town and its surroundings. Given my interest in how town 
residents navigate unequal social relationships, I worked 
with many affluent people (such as university professors, 
NGO workers, clergy, and small business owners) in addi-
tion to low-income residents like motel cleaners, waitstaff, 
and the unemployed. The voices of the affluent are dispro-
portionately represented here because most of the lower 
income residents I spoke with were migrant workers, a cat-
egory characterised by high turnover, who knew relatively 
little about other Butareans. The urban survivors with 
whom I did my fieldwork – roughly even numbers of male 
and female – all had at least some secondary education and 
spoke French fluently. They had lived in town between ten 
and forty years, but all of them had a rural upbringing and 
all faced the daunting task of rebuilding their livelihoods 
after the devastation of the genocide – two points that they 
emphasised when wishing to express commonality with the 
rural majority. I am mindful that educated urban dwellers 
are not representative of all Rwandans or even all Butare 
residents, but the post-genocide sense of social dislocation 
that my research participants express is by no means 
restricted to persons of their social position; Claudine Vidal 
(2001, 6) has noted similar findings among survivors in 
other towns and in rural areas. Thus, while educated resi-
dents might be especially at pains to articulate their knowl-
edge of what happened and to whom in 1994, all genocide 
survivors must contend with the problem of how to man-
age the absence of relations. I focus on this subset of Buta-
reans because the moral demands of remembering and the 
post-1994 difficulties of claiming belonging are especially 
visible among a mobile elite with strong affective ties to the 
local.
Informal narratives of loss were often recounted to me 
alone in private settings, but similar talk between Buta-
reans suggested that these were not accounts solely for fill-
ing in outsiders on what happened in 1994. However, a 
researcher’s presence affects the social situation and what is 
said or not in ways that cannot be easily ascertained, and so 
the content of the conversations I present here may differ 
from ordinary discourse between town residents. For 
instance, people’s knowledge of my interest in memory 
practices may have elevated the frequency of these nar-
ratives. There is also a broader post-1994 moral imperative 
not to make too much of one’s own problems because 
everyone is suffering the effects of violence. This tendency 
may have shaped conversations with me and could account 
for why others’ losses were emphasised over one’s own.
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The argument unfolds in four parts. First, I outline two 
prominent approaches to understanding the relationship 
between memory and violence in Rwanda and in other 
cases of political conflict. I suggest that neither one 
exhausts the question of how personhood is transformed 
by violence. Second, I situate my research participants’ 
memory practices in anthropological perspectives on per-
sonhood. In the last two sections, I detail two key eth-
nographic findings: first, that survivors maintain limited 
relations with the dead based on long-standing precepts as 
to what the living owe the deceased and second, that infor-
mal memory practices do the moral work of locating the 
speaker in the social space of Butare.
One might ask why I focus on the memory practices of 
Tutsi survivors when it is well recognised that scores of 
Hutu also lost family in the genocide and its aftermath. 
Since I worked with both Hutu and Tutsi town residents 
over the course of my fieldwork, to focus only on Tutsi 
losses seems to uncritically reproduce the Rwandan gov-
ernment’s denial of Hutu victimhood in the genocide and 
of crimes perpetrated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) against Hutu throughout the civil war of the 1990s 
and after the RPF took power in July 1994. However, recol-
lections of Hutu loss of life remained less accessible to me 
since they were raised only very rarely, in private settings 
with trusted interlocutors. Rwandans who speak openly of 
Hutu deaths open themselves to accusations of “revision-
ism” and of spreading the “double-genocide” thesis, a dan-
gerous crime because it undermines the narrative of Tutsi 
victimhood that is central to the government’s political 
legitimacy.3 Indeed, while struggles for official acknowl-
edgement of subaltern or marginalised memory are com-
mon in other postcolonial settings (e.g. Werbner 1998), the 
current political moment explains why we do not find sub-
stantial studies on the subject in Rwanda. Nonetheless, this 
fraught situation raises a compelling question: if my 
research participants’ informal recollections are not 
attempts to set the record straight against a national nar-
rative that denies their victimhood, why are survivors at 
pains to articulate them?
1. Beyond Memory, Nation, and Psychosocial Healing
Two sets of approaches are prominent in pursuit of ques-
tions about remembering, and by extension, forgetting, the 
violent past in the Rwandan context. The first considers the 
politics of memory and nation building and how narratives 
of the past are implicated in forging national identifica-
tions, reconciliation or forms of exclusion. In Rwanda, the 
political uses of memory raise the question of what a “just 
allotment” (Ricoeur 2004, xv) of memory and forgetting 
might be in terms of the nation’s capacity to forge unifying 
forms of belonging. On the one hand, scholars ask whether 
national memory politics are reproducing the ethnicised 
fault lines of the 1990s. Many researchers express concern 
that even as the government frames public remembering of 
genocide victims in terms of promoting unity, it risks 
reproducing the opposition between reified groups: Tutsi-
victim versus Hutu-perpetrator. These concerns are linked 
to the state restriction of victimhood to Tutsi at official 
commemorations of the genocide and the suppression of 
open dialogue about the past (Burnet 2009; Hintjens 2008; 
Vidal 2004). On the other hand, some scholars suggest that 
remembering violence on a public level might provide the 
means to overcome past conflicts by forging national unity 
and reconciliation and thereby prevent future violence or 
denial of genocide (Staub 2003). Many scholars have 
focused directly on this tension between remembering 
violence as obstacle versus pathway to peace and take up 
these questions vis-à-vis commemorative events and judi-
cial processes (Buckley-Zistel 2006; Longman and Ruta-
gengwa 2006; Rettig 2008).
A second set of approaches focuses on the relationship 
between memory and the psychosocial injuries of political 
violence. Some Rwanda scholars have characterised 
remembered violence – or the inability (or refusal) to nar-
rate it – as a form of suffering to be addressed through 
3  Scholars have noted a veritable “conspiracy of 
silence” by the Rwandan government when it comes 
to Hutu victimisation (Richters 2010, 177; Vidal 
2001, 45). The exception to the public denial of 
Hutu suffering and loss of life is the demarcation of 
the “Hutu moderates” category of genocide victims. 
As Nigel Eltringham (2004, 75–76) notes, however, 
this category is only used retrospectively to refer to 
Hutu killed in the 1990s for their opposition to the 
genocide. The troubling implication is that all 
“moderate” Hutu are dead and that those still alive 
supported the campaign of violence.
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therapeutic interventions for individual or social healing 
(Staub 2003, Steward 2008). These approaches engage with 
the issue of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), its 
degree of cross-cultural universality and long-standing 
debates around the nature of traumatic memory, its rela-
tionship to “normal” memory, recovery from psychosocial 
wounds, and intergenerational transmission of trauma 
(Argenti and Schramm 2010, Herman 1992; Young 1995). 
Here, the normative question of how much to remember or 
forget arises again, although the concern is as much with 
the psychological wellbeing of the individual as it is with 
collective cohesion (and it is worth remembering that the 
analogy between the individual and collective healing from 
the effects of violence is not uncontroversial [Young 1993]). 
In terms of Rwanda, central questions revolve around what 
healing interventions ought to look like, especially whether 
truth telling by victims and perpetrators and remembering 
violence is, indeed, cathartic (Brouneus 2010).
We could theorise informal memory practices using either 
of these approaches. We could read survivors’ attestations 
to loss as ongoing preoccupations with the past and evi-
dence that ethnic schisms persist in the face of government 
reconciliation and de-ethnicisation policies. We might the-
orise that a compulsion to recount one’s own or others’ 
losses indicates ongoing psychosocial suffering from 
experiences of violence. Perhaps people speak more often 
of others’ losses because it is less painful to communicate 
what happened to others in 1994 than to talk about one’s 
own absent relations. There were certainly times during my 
fieldwork when people showed concern for the question of 
what individual or collective “healing” entails or what the 
national political stakes of remembering violence might be. 
Nonetheless, I found that the significance of informal 
memory practices in Butare exceeds these approaches. 
While I am cautious of drawing too sharp a line between 
different “levels” of belonging, for the purposes of under-
standing what people are doing in their everyday memory 
practices, I find it useful to analytically distinguish between 
belonging at the “imagined” (Anderson 1991) level of the 
nation and belonging in one’s immediate social world of 
face-to-face relationships. By focusing primarily on the 
latter (but without losing sight of the former), I show how 
informal memory reaches into a complex repertoire of 
modes by which persons claim belonging in their social 
worlds and engage in moral practices vis-à-vis the dead.
2. Personhood at the Nexus of Collective and Individual Remembering
Two perspectives on the relationship between personhood 
and remembering violence frame this analysis. First, some 
may argue that attestations to other town residents’ losses 
are not “memories” at all in the sense that they may not 
concern what the speaker saw first hand. However, if we take 
remembering as an active process that transmits knowledge 
of the past between persons (Connerton 1989), then such 
practices are not outside the realm of “memory.” My 
research participants do not claim vicarious memory of 
events they never witnessed; they are instead remembering 
the fact of others’ losses and that there were once persons 
with them who are now gone. Informal remembering thus 
functions as a form of collective memory in the sense of a 
shared body of knowledge (Wertsch and Roediger 2008) – 
in this case, about who lost whom in the genocide. This is 
not to say that this body of knowledge is uncontested, static 
or unchanging, but since Butare’s genocide survivors are 
remarkably knowledgeable about how many and what kinds 
of relations others lost, I heard little debate over these facts.
Second, if remembering and personhood are mutually con-
stitutive, then any strict dichotomy between individual and 
collective memory obscures the fundamentally social 
nature of the person. In order to focus on the social con-
stitution of personhood through these practices of remem-
bering, we must, as Jeffrey Olick (1999, 346) suggests, 
overcome our common tendency to treat individuals and 
collectivities as strictly separate kinds of entities. Among 
the survivors with whom I worked, memory is a practice 
through which the shared body of knowledge of who lost 
whom in 1994 is deployed to make moral claims about 
social relationships and their absence. Indeed, a shared 
body of knowledge on losses incurred in 1994 is built 
through intersubjective remembering that is inseparable 
from the processes by which they struggle to reconstitute 
personhood in the absence of significant others.
Personhood is a cornerstone of the anthropological analy-
sis of social life. It deals with how people respond to the 
question: “Who are you?” Personhood is the basis on 
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which one becomes a recognised member of one’s social 
world and understands one’s location in social relation-
ships. Anthropologists underscore that the “egocentric per-
son” – the classic Western model of a bounded, 
autonomous individual and bearer of a unique identity – is 
by no means a universal view of the person and may not 
even properly capture Westerners’ experiences of selfhood.4 
A relational or “socio-centric” notion of personhood in 
which persons do not “have” relations but are rather con-
stituted by them is common to many an African context 
(Riesman 1986) and beyond (Geertz 1973; Strathern 1988). 
Taylor (1992, 2005) has underscored the relational nature 
of the Rwandan social person, which is never complete and 
is always being built out of relations with others. Exchange 
of social fluids like beer and milk create and maintain rela-
tionships that constitute persons, and the exchange of sex-
ual fluids through the fusion of each parent’s “gift of self” 
explains how a child is produced (Taylor 1992). Danielle 
De Lame (1996), in her ethnography of the rural hill of 
Murundi, has demonstrated how the nuanced practice of 
beer sharing and other exchange relations are central to the 
forging of belonging and recognition among co-residents. 
While rural survivors stress the economic hardships of hav-
ing lost key relations in 1994 (Buckley-Zistel 2006, 139) 
more so than educated urban dwellers, this relational con-
ception of personhood that bridges urban and rural con-
texts helps to grasp why authors like Vidal (2001) found 
forms of social dislocation among rural survivors not 
unlike those expressed by educated Butareans.
During my fieldwork, I noted a relational configuration of 
the person in Butare residents’ tendency to refer to others 
by kinship status more often than by their names. Such 
practices indicate that personhood and “who one is” are 
deeply connected to the question of to whom one is related 
and how.5 A friend or acquaintance with children is called 
la maman or le papa more often than by name, and modi-
fiers for age or other characteristics are used to distinguish 
people from each other (e.g. le vieux papa). Teknonymy, a 
practice by which parents are referred to by the names of 
their children, is also prominent in Butare. For example, 
friends and family of a married couple, Ferdinand and 
Josephine, usually called them by the teknonyms they 
acquired after the birth of their son, Kalisa: Mama-Kalisa 
and Papa-Kalisa. While kinship relations are by no means 
the only way in which personhood is configured in Butare 
(clientship and friendship are notable, too), I restrict my 
discussion to them because they are the central foci of 
informal attestations to loss and exchanges with the dead.
The question is, how do people who suddenly, and more-
over violently, lost many or even most of their relations in 
the 1994 genocide locate themselves in the absence of these 
relations? There are many possible approaches to this ques-
tion, but I look here to memory, the temporal axis of per-
sonhood (Antze and Lambek 1996, xxv). To draw on Paul 
Antze’s (1996) felicitous phrase, albeit in a very different 
ethnographic context, by telling stories – even very short 
ones interjected into other lines of conversation – survivors 
are making selves in the absence of relations that constitute 
the person. Indeed, echoing the way Janet Carsten (2000) 
has shown that relatedness is forged through shared sub-
stance, sentiment or space, in Butare shared experience and 
knowledge of one another’s loss and dislocation also con-
stitute grounds on which people engender belonging.
3. The Moral Economy of Exchange with the Dead
Genocide victims are not inert or absent from the world of 
the living. The notion that the dead are still involved in the 
affairs of the living is not a new, post-1994 phenomenon in 
Rwanda. In Rwandan cosmology, ancestor spirits can make 
malevolent interventions in the lives of the living, but 
thinking of them and making symbolic gestures of 
exchange maintains good relations (see also Taylor 1992). 
The duty to think of the dead has become all the more 
pressing vis-à-vis those who died so violently in 1994 and 
whose memorialisation is bound up with broader political 
questions of doing justice, forging peace, or condemning 
4 See Hollan (1992) for a critique of the egocen-
tric view of the Western self and its strict opposition 
to a non-Western socio-centric view of the person.
5 Butare residents also explain this reluctance to 
use proper names as a symptom of mistrust and 
secretiveness. It is not unusual for a new acquaint-
ance to avoid giving her or his name upon meeting. 
Residents who have lived in Euro-American contexts 
where first names are freely disclosed sometimes 
joke about how “Rwandan” it is not to introduce 
oneself by name.
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the absence of international action to stop the genocide 
(Vidal 2001). However, in the wake of the violence of 1994, 
relations of exchange with those who die “normal” deaths 
due to illness or old age seem to be declining in import-
ance. Catherine Coquio (2004, 158) has described the 
post-1994 banalisation of “natural” death in which the 
death of elderly family members is no longer considered 
tragic when juxtaposed to the deaths of the genocide. Vir-
tually without exception, those I spoke to treated “natural” 
death as something unremarkable that one must accept. 
“C’est comme ça, la vie,” was the phrase I heard used 
repeatedly when someone’s family member fell severely ill 
or passed away.
Simbi is a university graduate who, at the time of my field-
work, was in his mid-thirties and working on a temporary 
contract at a local NGO. As an RPF soldier during the civil 
war, he is not a civilian “survivor” as many of my other 
research participants were. Still, as a post-1994 Tutsi retur-
nee to Rwanda, he faces similar problems to other surviv-
ors in forging belonging. To assert his rootedness and 
authority on matters historical, Simbi routinely drew on 
his elderly father’s recollections of the colonial period and 
customary socio-cultural practices in southern Rwanda. He 
emphasised to me that, historically in Rwanda, it was not 
the body of a dead person that was treated with care, but 
the memory or the name of the person:
In our tradition, the body was not important. In fact, Rwandans 
can’t stand being near corpses – we always disposed of them 
quickly. So people would wrap the body in a mat, they would 
make their way into the forest, and they would abandon the 
body. Then they would run – as fast as they could – because 
they were afraid of the body but also because they were afraid of 
the animals who would come and eat the remains!
(May 2008, Butare)
Scholarly accounts of precolonial burial practices (Vidal 
2001, 2004) mirror Simbi’s description in many ways, but 
they also reveal a greater diversity. Rwandan funerary prac-
tices have historically varied considerably by region and 
even from family to family (van’t Spijker 1990, 39). Bodies 
were not always abandoned in uncultivated areas, and 
interment of deceased relatives within the enclosure of the 
rugo (rural homestead) was also common (van’t Spijker 
1990, 91, 98). Pauline confirmed Simbi’s assertion that 
burial sites were historically insignificant for Rwandan 
memory practices, but she underscored the importance of 
the practice of guterekera. Guterekera is a form of ancestor 
worship predicated on the notion that the dead continue to 
concern themselves with the affairs of the living and that 
the living can invoke the ancestors’ assistance by making 
offerings to them. In guterekera, beer, meat or whatever the 
deceased used to enjoy is shared between the living and the 
dead by sprinkling some on the ground (Taylor 1992, 142; 
van’t Spijker 1990, 18). Pauline explained:
If the dead person liked to drink, then everyone would drink. If 
he was known for giving to the poor, then everyone would do 
that. But it wasn’t just to honour the memory of the dead per-
son. It’s also because people were afraid. Afraid that the dead 
would come back and say that people aren’t doing anything for 
them! They may come back and do harm to people; they can be 
nasty spirits, so each time someone dies, the living retain their 
relations with these people.
(May 2008, Butare)
While many urban dwellers today tend to denigrate “tradi-
tional” beliefs about the dangers posed by the dead (some-
one who accidentally spills beer or food on the ground 
might be teased for “sharing with the ancestors”, for 
instance), educated Butareans by no means live in a com-
pletely disenchanted world. For them, the dead can still be 
helpful forces if treated with due care and respect. Indeed, 
Marcel Mauss famously saw reciprocal exchange as a 
“moral transaction, bringing about and maintaining 
human, personal relationships between individuals and 
groups” (Evans-Pritchard 1967, ix), and in this case, death 
does not sever exchange obligations completely. Views vary 
on how these exchanges should be practiced and the degree 
to which not only thinking of the dead, but also visiting 
burial sites is important in maintaining relations with the 
deceased. Some survivors express a desire to restore dignity 
to victims whose bodies were haphazardly tossed into mass 
graves or simply left to decompose; hence the post-1994 
emphasis on formal public commemorations, elaborate 
monuments, and the re-interment of bodies (Vidal 2001, 
16–17; 2004, 279). Memorials are most often visited during 
the annual genocide commemorations; then, crowds of 
Butare residents participate in walks to memorials around 
town, and the Association des Étudiants et Élèves Rescapés 
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du Génocide holds all-night vigils at the National Univer-
sity memorial. For some, however, being near the dead is 
an important part of keeping their memory close no 
matter the time of year. Thomas, a university student at the 
time of my fieldwork, who was proud of his ancestral ties 
to the precolonial royal court at Nyanza, talked about going 
to memorials when he needed to reflect on an important 
decision. As he explained: “I survived, so I want to bring 
value to my life. So I go and pray to the spirits of the dead 
to help me do good things with my life” (June 2008, 
Butare). On the few occasions when I saw people visiting 
memorial sites outside the annual week of mourning, the 
formality of the occasion was made evident by their impec-
cable dress and solemn demeanour. However, the majority 
of those I spoke with underscored why it is not compulsory 
to attend official commemorations or visit sites. As Rose, a 
small business owner, put it: “You think of those you lost 
every day. I don’t need a ceremony to remember” (Feb-
ruary 2009, Butare). Similarly, Pauline expressed horror at 
the idea of visiting memorials and told me that she 
regretted once having accompanied a Belgian friend to the 
Murambi memorial in Gikongoro because it disturbed her 
sleep for weeks. Some of her family members are buried at 
the Ngoma memorial in Butare, but she refuses to visit and 
declined to collect items of clothing that belonged to them. 
“I try so hard to remember them alive,” she explained. 
“Why would I want clothing to remind me of how they 
died?” (March 2009, Butare).
Whether one places importance on visiting burial sites or 
not, exchanges with the dead still involve thinking of them 
in exchange for assistance or protection. Pauline, sitting 
with me in the peaceful surroundings of her place of busi-
ness, described how her husband and children whom she 
lost in the genocide still help her to overcome major chal-
lenges. As she remarked one day after she had just dealt 
with a rather delicate problem concerning a business 
partner who was behind on his taxes and utility bill pay-
ments: “I know it’s they who are helping me. It’s my hus-
band and children – not God or Jesus! If I didn’t still feel 
them here with me, if I didn’t believe they were always 
close, I wouldn’t even be able to walk” (February 2008, 
Butare). Some survivors expressed guilt if they went too 
long without thinking of certain victims. “I think of the 
closest family I lost all the time,” Rose said in reference to 
her husband and children. “But then sometimes I realise 
that several weeks have passed since I thought of an aunt or 
cousin or brother, and I feel guilty [coupable]” (July 2008, 
Butare).
While thinking and speaking about genocide victims is a 
way of maintaining good relations with them, it is more-
over a way for survivors to remain connected to the 
relations that constitute their personhood. As Pauline once 
said, “You feel like pieces of them [kin; friends] are still 
here somewhere, even though you cannot know exactly. If I 
left Rwanda for good, I would feel guilty” (March 2009, 
Gisenyi). The dead are active agents in the present, not only 
because, controversially, some of their bodies have been left 
exposed at memorial sites as reminders of the scale of dev-
astation in 1994, but also because of the moral duty to 
maintain relations and the claims to (erstwhile) belonging 
in one’s social world that they make possible.
These limited exchange practices with the dead raise per-
ceptions of injustice among Rwandan genocide survivors 
that remain peripheral in approaches focused primarily on 
national memory politics or healing from trauma. Surviv-
ors express anger not only for what perpetrators of viol-
ence took from them, but also, crucially, for what accused 
or convicted perpetrators still have. Survivors who are at 
pains to maintain limited forms of exchange with the dead 
resent that many perpetrators still have relations and sup-
port networks. Since prisoners must rely on their families 
rather than the state for provisions, once or twice a week a 
stream of women can be seen making their way to the 
Butare prison and carrying food, small amounts of money, 
or other items requested by inmates. While prisoners are 
not permitted to see their family members on these occa-
sions, they have people to whom they can return home 
when they are released. Moreover, because prisoners in 
Rwanda are required to build infrastructure like roads and 
drainage ditches, they are to a limited extent permitted out 
in public. In Butare, they also run an auto repair garage 
and build furniture to sell to the public. From these points 
of contact with the general population, they maintain rela-
tionships of exchange and commerce with their family 
members and other townspeople.
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Meanwhile, genocide survivors like Pauline express a sense 
of dislocation in the absence of relations, and resentment 
of those accused of genocide crimes who do not suffer in 
the same way survivors do. She does not “know who she is 
anymore” in the absence of her pre-1994 relations, while 
those who are released from prison have families to whom 
they return. For her, this injustice is something she faces on 
a daily basis since victims and perpetrators released from 
prison share the same public space:
Now I walk around Butare, I go to Uganda on the bus. Am I 
really living? Yes, I have my projects, I know how to use money, 
but when I get into bed at night, I don’t know who I am any-
more. I’m tired so I’ll sleep, I sleep for a second, then I feel 
myself wake with a start – ok, I can’t stay awake anymore so I 
sleep. […] I’ve been forced to conclude that we have no 
country. We have victims who suffer injustice and we have 
killers who come and live with us. And the killers? They walk 
around, free and happy, they drink with their friends in the cab-
arets, they build houses, they have sex with their wives, they take 
the bus to Kigali with us. Can you imagine?
(February 2008, Butare)
Although many ex-prisoners did lose family members or 
do not easily resume their relationships upon returning 
home, for those who lost the majority of their kin in 1994, 
there is nonetheless resentment towards perpetrators who 
have people with whom to rebuild relations at all. Con-
cerns like these should not be read simply as evidence that 
Tutsi survivors harbour resentment towards the blanket 
category of Hutu perpetrators. Rather, they speak to a dif-
ferent scale of injustice, namely the everyday anguish of liv-
ing with absence and no longer knowing oneself. The 
significance of having relationships and the hardship and 
disconnect that comes from their absence is perhaps best 
captured in something that Pauline reported génocidaires 
having sometimes said to those Tutsi whom they spared 
during the genocide: rather than dying right then, the sur-
vivor would instead die a slow “death of sadness” in the 
absence of everyone to whom she or he was related.
4. Personhood in the Absence of Relations
While exchange with the dead is an important moral prac-
tice for educated Butare residents who have lost many of 
their relations, these exchanges do not sufficiently com-
pensate for the losses of the relations that constitute per-
sonhood. The social context of attestations to loss in 
everyday conversation is what demands attention and what 
suggests that these narratives are meaningful practices 
deployed to make particular kinds of claims about the self.
Affluent town residents place importance on the moral 
dimensions of being embedded in local networks, on being 
“of” the town. For educated and relatively wealthy genocide 
survivors, there are particular challenges associated with 
this, which are common among postcolonial urbanites who 
seem to have one foot in the world of the local and the 
other in the world of the former coloniser or the global 
north more generally (Cohn 1996). To be called or treated 
as a stranger carries a particular sting for affluent Butareans 
– not just those of Tutsi descent.6 It connotes an accusation 
of being more interested in forging ties to the resources, 
knowledge and power of Westerners. To ally oneself too 
much with Westerners can lead to accusations of having 
become a muzungu (white person) or no longer being able 
to understand the problems of “ordinary Rwandans.” On 
four occasions that I am aware of, such accusations were 
levelled at friends of mine for having been seen with me. 
Because of their wealth and modern Western dress, many 
Butareans complain of being charged the “muzungu price” 
at the market. And after visiting a Canadian friend in 
Ottawa in 2008, Pauline returned home to discover that a 
neighbour had been spreading the rumour that she had left 
for good and no longer cared about Rwanda and its people. 
This rumour had necessitated weeks of damage control 
during which Pauline had to correct the assumption that 
she was no longer living in Butare. Indeed, for no one is the 
moral importance of remaining “of” Butare more sig-
nificant than for the affluent town residents I knew – those 
6 However, since the anti-Tutsi propaganda of 
the 1990s famously represented them as 
“foreigners” or interlopers in the “Hutu nation”, 
affluent Tutsi in Butare perhaps still possess par-
ticularly strong sensitivities to accusations of being 
a foreigner.
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who travel internationally for conferences and consult-
ancies, study or pleasure, and who speak the colonial lan-
guage of French (or, increasingly, English7) effortlessly. The 
claim to belong takes on particular significance in light of a 
postcolonial political economy that makes intellectuals, 
small business owners, and other affluent Butare residents 
symbolically and materially distant from “ordinary 
Rwandans”. While I often heard low-income town residents 
complain that it is as though local professionals and entre-
preneurs “live in another world”, claims by materially privi-
leged residents to knowing about others’ losses and having 
suffered together in 1994 are a form of moral agency that 
might mitigate such accusations. Educated Butareans no 
doubt faced similar challenges in claiming belonging due to 
class differences prior to 1994, but they perceive a sharp 
contrast between how they fit into their social worlds 
before and after the genocide. Some may idealise the degree 
to which they were thought to belong before, but it is per-
haps all the more significant if they do: to remember pre-
genocide modes of belonging as relatively unproblematic 
lays bare how the absence of robust kinship networks com-
pounds affluent urban dwellers’ sensitivity to social divi-
sions between themselves and the low income majority.
Concerns over being treated or perceived as a stranger are 
evident in survivors’ anxieties about where they fit in 
today. Many lament how few people they still know in 
Butare. Hélèna, a survivor in her forties who works for a 
local HIV/AIDS NGO, revealed one day:
I was born on this hill, but since 1994 I’ve lived all over. Brus-
sels, the United States, Japan, Kenya, and now I am back. But it 
hardly feels like my home […] everyone I know is gone. They 
were all killed, so I don’t know anyone anymore. The only 
people I know now are the prisoners who work on the roads 
around here who greet me when I pass. Can you imagine?
(February 2009, Butare)
On another occasion, Pauline and I had been walking all 
over town. I crossed paths with her again the next day, and 
she looked sullen. She explained that our walk had rem-
inded her of the absences of those she used to know:
Everyone I know is gone, and the new neighbours look at me like 
I don’t even belong when I’ve lived here all my life! Can you 
believe that we walked around the entire town yesterday and I 
only ran into three people I know? Three! Everyone I knew is 
gone. I don’t even want to know the new neighbours. I thought I 
was the one who was watching them, but I couldn’t believe it 
when I realised that they’re watching me like I’m a foreigner, too!
(February 2009, Butare)
It is in this space of loss and absence that the significance of 
survivors’ informal practices of remembering is located. 
Below, I recount a series of these narratives. I selected them 
not because they stand out as remarkable, but for their rep-
resentativeness of the accounts one is likely to hear in 
informal conversation. Regardless of their precipitating 
factors, all assert a claim to knowing what happened in 
Butare and to whom.
4.1. A Suffering Friend
One afternoon in March 2009, Daniel, a National Univer-
sity graduate, and I were with Hélèna at her home in 
Butare. We had been discussing the improvements in local 
police responses to incidents of domestic violence when for 
reasons unknown to me, a younger sibling brought out an 
envelope of photos and handed it to her. “That’s me there,” 
she said, pointing to a picture of herself and several other 
young female family members taken some years ago before 
the genocide. “Almost everyone in this photo is gone now. 
We were so close back then.” She reflected on the impunity 
of the perpetrators of the genocide, and then spoke about 
the losses of a female friend of hers:
You know, I have a friend who only just found out at gacaca 
[local level genocide tribunal] that it was her own husband who 
was responsible for killing her whole family – her mother and 
father, her siblings, all her relations. Can you imagine? Her own 
husband. He never even told her. He just went out one day, 
killed them all and never said a word. And the craziest part? She 
7 In 2008, the government of Rwanda declared 
that the language of instruction in schools would be 
changed from French, the Belgian colonial language, 
to English. Explanations for the change tend to 
assert that it was a strategic politico-economic move 
as part of Rwanda’s bid to join the British Com-
monwealth and the East African Community, but 
observers also contend that it was a political move 
and rejection of the former Francophone colonisers 
on whom the current government blames the ethnic 
schisms at the base of the 1994 genocide.
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4.2. The Loss of a Sister
On a long hike in the rural areas around Butare, Simbi had 
been quizzing me about my knowledge of local agricultural 
crops – knowledge deemed crucial for anyone who claims 
to “know” Rwanda. All of a sudden, we were passed by 
somebody he knew from when they were both at university, 
who was careening down the hill on his motorcycle, hands 
and feet in the air while waving to Simbi. As he disappeared 
around the corner, Simbi, laughing at his antics, explained:
Il est fou, ce type [This guy’s crazy]! You know, he survived the 
genocide, but he lost his mind after what happened. It’s true, 
they killed his whole family – parents, uncles, aunts, everyone. 
But what really did him in was that they killed his twin sister. 
He’s never been the same since then, although he has calmed 
down a bit since they found her body. Before that, he used to 
talk of nothing but revenge, but now he’s mostly harmless. But 
before, I used to see him in the cabarets and he would always be 
looking for a fight. I had to stop him myself a few times. 
(July 2008, Southern Province)
4.3. Enumerating Acquaintances’ Losses
On another occasion in June 2008, Simbi and I ran into a 
prominent local official and small business owner who had 
been attempting to help Simbi secure a stable job as a favour 
to Simbi’s brother-in-law. After we had parted company, 
Simbi explained, “He lost his wife and three children in the 
genocide. He suffers every day without them.” Shortly 
thereafter we crossed paths with a middle-aged woman 
Simbi knew from the now defunct University Club gym. As 
is typical, we paused, exchanged greetings, and they shared 
news for a few moments before we moved on. As we began 
to walk again, Simbi told me, “She is a [genocide] survivor 
and she lost all seven of her children – can you imagine?”
4.4. Knowing the Private Lives of Others
One afternoon in May 2008, I was at the university chatting 
with a recent graduate, Emmanuel. We had been talking 
about his job prospects and the possibility of his pursuing 
graduate study when, for reasons I was unable to discern, 
he began to recount the tragic losses suffered during the 
genocide by a mutual acquaintance, Florence, who works at 
the National University. Emmanuel, a genocide survivor 
himself, explained the complications that Florence has had 
to face in her family relationships since 1994.
The first problem is that it was some of her in-laws who killed 
her husband and four of her five children. Can you imagine? 
But more than that, she told me once that she feels it is her fault 
that only she and her youngest child survived. Before the geno-
cide, her husband had told her that he thought four children 
were enough, but she wanted more. Her husband was angry 
when he found out she was pregnant, and he told her that 
meant that the first four children were for him, but the last one 
was for her. Now, because he and the four oldest were killed, she 
thinks that the others died because he had claimed the oldest 
children as his and left the youngest to her.
(June 2008, Butare)
4.5. The Loss of a Husband
Often I would accompany Pauline on errands, and she 
would narrate to me what had happened to other survivors 
as we passed by their homes, places of business, or a burial 
site. As we passed by a quiet neighbourhood bar one after-
noon in March 2009, she told me what had happened to 
the Tutsi survivor who now owns and operates it:
You know this place? It’s a woman who owns it now, a survivor. 
Back in ’94, her husband had the foresight to take her and their 
four boys to Burundi after the genocide started in Kigali.8 But 
he came back after he left them there. He thought it wasn’t dan-
gerous here in Butare because the killing hadn’t started here yet. 
He thought, “oh, if I come back, maybe I could recover a few of 
our belongings.” But he was killed at their home and she never 
saw him again.
(March 2009, Butare)
What is striking about these accounts is that everyone 
knew everyone else’s details: how many family members 
died in the genocide, what types of relations they were, and 
even how and where they were killed. In a small town like 
Butare, perhaps this should be expected, and yet it is 
remarkable given how often it emerged that affluent resi-
dents did not knew each other or that they know very little 
8 Violence did not befall Butare province until 
roughly two weeks after it had begun elsewhere.
stayed with him after that! I said to her, you have to leave him 
after what he did. But she said she couldn’t because he’s the 
only one [husband] she’s ever known.
(March 2009, Butare)
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about each other beyond their stories of loss in 1994. 
Moreover, to keep straight the details of so many people’s 
hardships requires a level of care that is unusual between 
people who are not particularly close. It would be easy to 
dismiss these narratives as little more than the routine gos-
sip that characterises social relationships in small towns. I 
see these more as memorial practices than gossip since the 
latter tends to thrive when the facts are uncertain (Merry 
1997, 51); but even if we do read gossip into how Butare’s 
survivors speak of others losses, it is nonetheless note-
worthy as a central way of demonstrating one’s belonging 
and “insider knowledge” of the lives of fellow town resi-
dents. By asserting knowledge of others’ losses, survivors 
evoke the absence of the relationships that constitute their 
own personhood and that of other survivors. Therefore, to 
speak about the genocide and what happened to people is 
not just evidence that national reconciliation policies are 
failing or that people are unable to heal from the trauma of 
violence. Informal memorial practices, when situated in 
their social contexts and in webs of social relationships, are 
complex in their meanings, and while they may tell us 
something about the state of ethnic schisms and psycho-
social “healing,” they cannot be reduced to them.
What is central is that these narratives and reflections are 
doing moral work; they are among the few ways left by 
which these town residents can stake a claim to having had 
the relationships constitutive of personhood and rooted-
ness in Butare. When people can no longer actively live 
their relationships with family and other relations, they 
invoke those absences, as well as what happened to other 
survivors as a way of saying, “I have knowledge of this 
town and its residents, and I am still ‘of’ this place.” These 
claims to belonging are speech acts in Austin’s (1962) 
sense: by deploying them, survivors are “doing things” with 
words, and they are deeply aware of the potential for infel-
icities should their claims to belonging not be received as 
intended. Indeed, it is crucial that survivors track out these 
relationships beyond their own families because to know 
about the losses of even distant acquaintances is what does 
some of the most important work of grounding survivors 
as members of their social worlds. This is in no way to say 
that survivors disingenuously instrumentalise their own 
and others’ losses to make strategic claims about belong-
ing. Claims to the absence (and therefore, erstwhile pres-
ence) of the relationships that constitute personhood are 
directed as much inward to assuaging doubts about one’s 
selfhood as towards making claims about one’s moral 
status and connection to Rwanda. Indeed, seen from the 
perspective of relational personhood in which the self is 
always being built out of relations with others, to lose those 
relations is to lose a part of one’s own person. Para-
doxically, then, the violence is what severed survivors’ rela-
tionships, their connections to “here”, and what permits 
them to continue to show how they fit in with others in 
their social worlds through memory practices. Tracking out 
the networks in which they used to be embedded, coupled 
with exchange relations maintained with the dead, is what 
stands in for living out the relationships that used to con-
stitute their personhood. Indeed, these attestations to loss 
are never just about the past, but are always also about how 
that past paradoxically connects persons to and discon-
nects them from their social worlds. Since it goes without 
saying in Butare that everyone has had terrible problems 
since 1994, to have suffered with others is a way that 
mobile town residents often accused of becoming strangers 
or bazungu [pl. form of muzungu] stake claims to ongoing 
locatedness and attachments to local people and places.
5. Conclusion
I have shown that informal talk about the 1994 genocide 
and its victims is a practice that speaks to the ruptures in 
relationships constitutive of survivors’ personhood and the 
ways in which the violent past enters into everyday prac-
tices of making selves and forging relationships. That edu-
cated survivors are at pains to assure themselves and others 
that their claims to “hereness” are legitimate demonstrates 
that there is no contradiction between having ties to power 
on the one hand and being devastated by loss and dis-
location on the other. What their informal memory prac-
tices reveal is that people now navigate complex 
predicaments of what it means to dwell in a present that is 
marred by the absence of friends, family and neighbours 
with whom they once socialised and with whom they were 
engaged in relations of mutual dependency – a problem 
that is by no means restricted to educated survivors in 
Butare. Indeed, it is the challenges that these Butareans face 
in claiming locatedness that put the effects of the sudden 
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and widespread loss of kin on relational persons into par-
ticularly sharp focus.
A focus on personhood and its diverse cross-cultural con-
figurations can enrich current perspectives on memory and 
violence. Indeed, the effects of violence on relational selves 
are not easily apprehended through national reconciliation 
or trauma-focused frameworks that implicitly or explicitly 
take persons as discrete individuals who “have” relations. 
Recovery from violence as conceptualised in these frame-
works means that the cohesive, integrated, bounded person 
and relations between such persons should be restored – 
although debates abound on the techniques through which 
to effect those changes, be they judicial, political, retribu-
tive or restorative. But if one is one’s relations, if in losing 
one’s relations one loses parts of one’s own person, can 
frameworks based on “healing” or “reconciliation” com-
municate the texture of how violence affects the self? An 
ethnographic perspective on the relationship between per-
sonhood, memory and violence suggests that memory 
practices are located not just against the “background” of a 
violent past, but within broader patterns of everyday social 
relationships and precepts for the living of a moral life. The 
concept of personhood – situated at the nexus of the indi-
vidual and the collective and bound up with questions 
about one’s place in the world – is a strong conceptual tool 
for investigating these dimensions of how remembered 
violence matters.
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